“One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six who jumped in the rear, we need massive EMS here.”

Most of you reading this have already probably heard the sad news on the passing of FDNY Brother Joey DiBernardo, one of six forced to jump 4 stories rather than be burnt alive back in January of 2005 in what has come to be known as “Black Sunday.” 

Of the six, Lieutenant John G. Bellew and Lieutenant Curtis Meyran succumbed to their injuries that day.  Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Eugene Stolowski, and Brendan Cawley survived their jumps along with Lieutenant DiBernardo with massive physical injuries as well as haunting emotional trauma which remains to this day.

This morning an email from www.FirefighterCloseCalls.com (Home of the Secret List) is making its way to thousands of Brothers and Sisters, imploring all of us to take a few short moments to fully understand what has happened and who we have just lost.  Along with Chief Goldfeder and the others at Firefighter Close Calls, I want to make sure everyone gets this important message as we prepare to lay our Brother to rest tomorrow. 

Please ensure these videos are seen by all your companies, either at roll call, or shortly thereafter.  If you are on a volunteer department, please forward this information to all your contacts immediately.

For further enlightenment, utilize the NIOSH report and encourage discussion among your crews.  As usual, Command Safety lays out all the information you need to make the training useable, understandable, and accessible.

Here are the links:

Message from Firefighter Close Calls

Video about Brother Joey DiBernardo

Video about the Black Sunday Fire.

NIOSH Report

Command Safety’s Comprehensive Look at the Incident

God Bless you, Joey.  May he keep you in His tender care.

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Today’s Chicago Tribune includes a report by Trib reporter William Lee who draws our attention to the NIOSH report summary released earlier this month on the August 9^th death of Chicago firefighter/paramedic Christopher Wheatley.

You may recall that Chris fell 53 feet to his death while using a fire escape ladder in ascending to the roof of a four-story West Loop building.  He was wearing full turnout gear and carrying a 63- pound hand pump.

In a nutshell, the report summary says that, although Chris was directed to ascend to the roof via an aerial ladder, he instead opted to use the building's fire escape system. 

Second-guessing Chris’ actions and decisions in this case will not help us to understand why he chose this route to the roof.  We’ll never know, so let’s put that aside for a moment.

Rather, I found myself contemplating this thought:  Given the same circumstances, what would I have done? 

What would you have done?

Is it important to follow each fireground order to the letter, or should we have the latitude to act upon our instincts and experience to get the job done?

Take a look at the NIOSH summary report, it’s not that long and well worth your time.  Then ask yourself just how probable it would be that you may have done the same thing.  Next, discuss it with your crew.  How do they feel about this:

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Link to the live show

Join in on Tuesday May 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the Streets^TM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

This edition of Taking it to the Streets^TM the program is all about being COMBAT READY and THE FIRE SERVICE WARRIOR

Joining the program will be special guest, Christopher Brennan the author of The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness, published by PennWell Books and the author of the notable blogsite, The Fire Service Warrior.

Christopher Brennan is a firefighter in the suburbs outside Chicago; a field instructor for the Illinois Fire Service Institute; and a consultant for local, state, and federal agencies.

He joined the fire service in 1997 as a paid-on-call member of the Calumet Park (IL) Fire Department.

During his career, Chris has worked for the Calumet Park Fire Department, part-time for the Darien-Woodridge (IL) Fire Protection District, and as a career firefighter and engineer with the Harvey (IL) Fire Department.Chris is an active instructor teaching for the Illinois Fire Service Institute, has taught terrorism response training overseas, and has been an instructor for FDIC.

He is a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Society of Fire Service Instructors, and the Illinois Society of Fire Service Instructors.

He is also the author of numerous articles for fire service magazines, including Fire Engineering.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the path of the fire service warrior.

Discussions on what is meant by embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for suggested optimum fireground performance— and its potential application towards reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities

We’ll further explore how as Christopher Brennan states; “Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen”.

LINKS

• Surviving on the Fireground: Chris Brennan Talks Situational Awareness at FDIC 2011, HERE
• A Culture of Excellence – Christopher Brennan , HERE
• The Fire Service Warrior Blog, HERE

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"You can do everything right in this job and still get killed" – Paddy Brown, Captain Ladder 3 – lost 09/11/01

Wednesday night, the Firefighter Netcast family grows once again as John and Rhett welcome the newest member of the Firefighter Netcast family, Lieutenant David LeBlanc, from East Harwich, MA.

His new program is called “Taking Up”- reflections on the right, the wrong, and the why.  In each program, Dave will facilitate commentary about today’s Fire Service, training and techniques. We’ll be focusing on keeping our members safe while adhering to the principals of our Profession. 

Dave is not a stranger to Firefighter Netcast, having been a contributor and guest several times over the last year.  Indeed, he has made a great impression on us all. He is also a contributor to Backstep Firefighter over at Fire EMS Blogs as well as many other sites..

Through his writings and appearances on the show, one thing becomes glaringly clear:  Dave LeBlanc is passionate about the fire service.  He is never afraid to voice his opinion, yet can always be counted on to respect those who differ with him.

This is exactly the type of discussion Firefighter Netcast is looking to create- that banter back and forth around the station’s kitchen table, or as we jaw around the back step of the apparatus.

Dave LeBlanc began in the Fire Service in 1986.  He was a Call Firefighter for the Dennis Fire Department and a Volunteer for both the West Haven Fire Department and the Allingtown Fire Department in West Haven, Connecticut.  He has a Bachelors degree in Arson Investigation from the University of New Haven.  

In 1993 he started working full time for Harwich Fire Department in Massachusetts as a Fire Alarm Operator.  He became a Firefighter in 2000.  He is currently a Lieutenant assigned to Harwich Station 2 in East Harwich, MA.  Now, he brings his experience, his ideas, and his flavor to Firefighter Netcast.

So, join us live on Wednesday night, April 6 at 9pm ET for the premiere of “Taking Up”, or visit FirefighterNetcast.com to download this and every other show for listening at your leisure.

Firefighter Netcast- this ain’t your Daddy’s fire service radio podcast…..

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I would like to direct your attention to Backstep Firefighter and today’s well-written article “The 2011 Firefighter” by my fellow brother, Dave LeBlanc.  Among other things, Dave wrote about being an aggressive firefighter vs. an overly-safety-conscious firefighter as we enter the New Year.

This is a topic that will be revisited on a regular basis- in 2011 and that is a good thing.  I’ve heard excellent arguments on both sides of the issue, and Dave is one of the best at articulating his opinions on the issue.  In fact,  Firefighter Netcast’s Chris Naum recently hosted “Looking Forward through the Rearview Mirror” on his program “Taking it to the Streets” during which this very topic was discussed.

You can download this impressive show to your mp3 player here.

As we continue to debate aggressive vs. safe, I would encourage everyone to consider that the truly successful, efficient, and valued public servant will be the intelligent, well-trained firefighter who neither goes completely aggressive nor ineffectively safe.

If you want to be the best, most efficient savior of lives and property, then you will come to understand there is an inherent value on both ends of the debate.

This will lead you to gain the intelligence and experience to become the 21^st century firefighter- one who is BOTH effectively aggressive enough to bravely do what needs to be done to protect lives and property AS WELL AS smart enough to make intelligent decisions on the fireground that will allow us to perform our tasks without making the human mistakes that continue to injure and kill us each year.

Not either/or.

Both.

Are any of these statements untrue?

• Constant training makes us better firefighters
• If we apply the lessons learned from our experiences, we become better at what we do.
• Our job is intrinsically dangerous.
• We will never be able to guarantee we will all go home at the end of the day.
• The success of the 21^st century firefighter will depend upon intelligence coupled with bravery, aggressiveness coupled with smarts.

We need to recognize that there is more to the debate than the either/or two polar opposites being bandied about in the recent past.

Thank you for reading Fire Daily.  I hope it has helped spur your thinking.

Here’s to a happy, safe, smart, and proud New Year!

-J

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not again.....

NIOSH Report 2010-10 is out, and it ain’t pretty.

Familiar? Yes.

Pretty?  Pretty hard to swallow…again.

The report once again shines the tired spotlight upon familiar factors that continue to injure and kill firefighters despite our commitment to “never forget.”

But we are forgetting.

First, a short review of the findings made by NIOSH on this interior attack on a well-involved residence with the report of people trapped inside.

On March 30, 2010 The Homewood (IL) Fire Department arrived and found heavy fire conditions at the rear of the house and moderate smoke conditions elsewhere inside.  A search crew immediately entered to rescue a civilian trapped in the rear of the house, and a handline crew quickly advanced a 2 ½ inch line into the front door.

conditions as crews went interior (photo by Warren Skalski)

From the report, a photo of the A-B corner showing conditions prior to the hostile fire event in which thick, black smoke can be scene billowing out the front door, A-side.   Although difficult to see in this photo, the A-side picture windows are covered in soot.  What can we determine is going on inside as two are searching and two are operating a hoseline?

Here’s a shot of smoke blowing out horizontally from the B-side window after just being broken out by the firefighter there.  Smoke is now pumping out with more speed from the front door.  What is going on “inside the box” where the hoseline and search crews are operating?  Now are we at a point in which we’re just about to kill firefighters?

At this moment, interior crews observed thick black rolling (moving) smoke banked down to knee level.  As ventilation was taking place, the search crew saw flames rolling over through the smoke near the ceiling.

Then it happened.

That which we now all see from the comfort of our laptops and computer monitors- that which we have seen coming for quite some time in this story- moreover that for which we have been trained constantly- a hostile fire event (in this case a flashover) occurs.

It was inevitable here, and it was deadly here.

photo by Warren Skalski

According to the report, the search crew yelled to the hose crew to “get out” as they exited the building, then returned inside to rescue an injured hoseline firefighter.  Once she was brought out, they returned in to find the victim firefighter trapped in his ruptured 2 ½” line with is SCBA facepiece removed.  He was quickly removed and worked on the scene by paramedics before being transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

What can you do, reader, to keep this from happening the next time you find yourself on this type of incident, all too common for firefighters throughout the nation?

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Let’s see what NIOSH identified as factors which contributed to the death of one firefighter and the injury of another:

• Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon arrival
• Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up
• Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
• Ineffective fire control tactics
• Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions
• Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior
• Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
• Inadequate command, control, and accountability
• Insufficient staffing.

NIOSH RECOMMENDATIONS

From their investigation, NIOSH offers recommendations which can be extremely useful for any fire department member, officer, training officer, and command staff to get across to their organization before they respond to a similar incident.  Here are their recommendations:

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations.

photo by John Ratko

According to this report, a 360 was not done prior to the interior attack, and here’s what they would have seen in this photo shot from the C-side.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline.

The report looks at the handline selection of the interior crew, pointing out the relative maneuverability that an 1 ¾” line has over the deuce and a half used here.

“Fire fighters and officers need to understand that while a 2½-inch hoseline provides a greater flow, fire fighters need to be able to move the line quickly and efficiently interiorly, especially when performing a search and experiencing deteriorating fire conditions.”

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities.

The report describes a point where the hoseline team became separated.  The 2010 IAFC ROE of Structural Firefighting states, “Go in together, stay together, come out together.”

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior.

From the report:  “The search and rescue crew (operating without the protection of a hoseline) were able to make a quick determination that the conditions within the house were imminent to flashover. They made an attempt to alert the victim and injured fire fighter/paramedic, but were too late.”

“If conditions are right for a flashover, there are only seconds to make a decision. Fire fighters will be met with a sudden increase in heat and rollover within the ceiling level. The injured fire fighter/paramedic was unaware that the conditions she was operating in deteriorated quickly. She remembers thick, black smoke pushing down to the floor while in the structure and then “the room and everything in it caught fire.”

“Prior to the flashover, windows on the B-side were vented and thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke billowed from these windows. The IC, and individuals working on the exterior, need to recognize this as a potential for extreme fire behavior and evacuate interior crews. Obtaining proper training and hands-on experience through the use of a flashover simulator may assist interior fire fighters in making sound decisions on when to evacuate a structure fire.”

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat.

Again, from the report:   “During this incident, uncoordinated ventilation occurred while the hoseline and search and rescue crews were inside the house. The victim and other fire fighters, within the small house, were between the fire and the ventilation source. One fire fighter accounts heavy, turbulent, black smoke pushing from a window on the B-side after it was broken. Shortly after, the house sustained an apparent ventilation-induced flashover.”

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

The victim firefighter was found with his facepiece removed.  No conclusion has been drawn as to whether he removed it or whether it became dislodged from an exterior force.  But the report emphasizes that firefighters be trained on those SCBA emergency procedures which have been shown to offer the best possible chance for survival.

Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents.

See if you’ve heard this type of staffing report before:

“During this incident, the victim’s department responded with three personnel on the engine and two personnel on the ambulance, but the Still assignment also consisted of an engine, two ladder trucks, and a squad, with four fire personnel on each. It was routine to have an ambulance respond with an engine on a first due fire assignment. Due to short staffing, the ambulance personnel were tasked with fire suppression activities, thus taking them out-of-service as a medical unit.”

“Also, due to short staffing, the lieutenant/acting officer (IC) was required to ride and operate as the officer of E534. This removed him from his command response vehicle which would have allowed him to command at a tactical level versus having to potentially perform tasks.”

[Reader: Insert your emotional comment here]

Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that staff for emergency medical services is available at all times during fireground operations.

During this incident, the victim and the injured fire fighter/paramedic responded in an ambulance.  Upon their arrival to the scene, the IC immediately tasked them with interior operations due to staffing issues. The IC did not request an additional ambulance to respond to the scene for medical care until after the victim was down within the house. Additional resources (e.g., apparatus and personnel) arrived minutes after the ambulance’s arrival.

Recommendation #9: Fire departments and dispatch centers should ensure they are capable of communicating with each other without having to monitor multiple channels/frequencies on more than one radio.

During this incident, the IC had to monitor more than one radio and even had to go to the cab of his engine to accomplish this task. Having to monitor multiple radios and potentially take your eyes off the scene for a moment could be extremely detrimental to the management of the incident.

Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander, or designee, maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground.

During this incident, the accountability system was never set in place and a PAR was not conducted following the Mayday.

Recommendation #11: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression.

During this incident, the victim was discovered without a hood over his head or rolled down on his neck. NIOSH investigators could not determine whether this equipment was properly donned prior to the incident.

Recommendation #12: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.

Although there is no evidence that this recommendation, or certain others made above would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice.

Recommendation #13: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are equipped with a means to communicate with fireground personnel before entering a structure fire.

During this incident, the victim did have a radio, but it was positioned in the back pocket of his station pants. Thus, when he donned his bunker pants, his radio became inaccessible during the incident.

Recommendation #14: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) should consider developing more comprehensive training requirements for fire behavior to be required in NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications.

Here, here!  Let’s not forget the basics: Building Construction and Fire Behavior!  Check this out and compare it to your training records:

“According to documented training reviewed by NIOSH investigators, the victim, injured fire fighter/paramedic, and IC had a combined 24 hours of fire behavior training out of 5,654 total combined training hours. Additional fire behavior training to include such areas as theory, chemistry, physics, smoke reading, current research, and the cause and effects of tactics during fire suppression operations may improve fire fighter safety.”

24 HOURS BETWEEN THE THREE OF THEM!

Again, I ask you, “How can the death of brother firefighter Brian Carey teach us that his life was not lost in vain?”

Again, I tell you: “Learn from what happened from that day.  Then perform a long hard look at the way your organization operates, and utilize what you’ve learned here to make the changes necessary to ensure you and your brothers head home after the fire.

I can tell you that the news reports here in Chicago are all approaching this story from the standpoint that the fire department was “ill-prepared” in this case.  Imagine how this sucks for this fire department, and each of the members that have to re-live the events of that night all over again- this time while being publicly undressed in the press.

Brian Carey

Then empathize with them and ask yourself how you would feel- as a proud firefighter- if this had been your department?

Don’t allow yourself the superficial response of pointing your finger at this department.  That won’t help now.  Instead, turn the finger back toward yourself and create from this tragic story a positive learning experience and opportunity to improve your situation.

START TODAY!

Stay stoked!

-J

To donate to the Brian Carey Memorial Fund, visit www.rideforboo.org. The site also offers registration for those interested in taking part in the ride to Colorado. Donations also can be made at any First Midwest Bank branch or can be mailed to: Brian Carey Memorial Fund, P.O. Box 1171, Homewood, IL 60430. For more information about any of the events, contact Mike Bell at (708) 653-1394

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As you probably already know, an unprecedented meeting of the American fire service met in Tampa back in 2004.  The Life Safety Task Force generated a list of 16 Life Safety Initiatives. I’m sure most of us had seen or heard them.  But, if you are truly dedicated to saving your lives and the lives of those on your department and your crew, you will have come pretty damn close to memorizing them.  Yes, they are that important.

I’d like to touch on one of those today. It is the fourth initiative, and it reads as follows:  “All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.”

In preparation of our latest program over at Firefighter NetCast, I was exposed to the arguments both for and against the use of positive-pressure attack.  Chief John Kriska, a proponent of PPA, was the featured guest for the program which can be found at our site http://FirefighterNetCast.com or over at iTunes under firefighter podcasts.  I ran across what may well be the best video out there to demonstrate what happens when a PPV is set in a doorway and started before adequate thought is given to its potential effects.

I have accumulated a fair amount of training whether it has been in the classroom, at a controlled practical evolution, or on the fireground itself.   I know you have too, because I’ve seen you there as well, learning new ways to perform tasks, honing skills you’ve already learned, and perhaps even sharing your knowledge with others.

Help me then if you will, to figure out why we continue to see examples of near-fatal consequences on the videos regularly making the rounds on the internet?  Surely you know of a few of these head-shaking videos, and you may have seen this one as well.

This article is not meant to argue whether or not PPA/PPV should be used on your fireground.  Rather, as you watch the video, count how many “trained firefighters” it takes to kill an interior crew.  Take a peek:

As this video clearly shows, there are several on the fireground who seem to have forgotten some of the basic stuff we learned in our very first fire training classes: fire behavior.  As a “trained firefighter”, can you read the smoke?  Does it tell you what is happening inside this “box”?  Has the fire vented?  Will it?  What’s going to happen when it does vent?  Where do you want to be when this happens?  Would you have done anything differently before crawling inside?

Of course!

Sitting here in front of your computer monitor, not many of you would miss the signs of an impending hostile fire event, would you?  I wonder if the guys in this video would see the same signs if they were watching the video rather than performing the dance toward death.  If they were “trained” they probably would have seen the problems.  Why then, did no one speak up in a real situation?

I’ve seen it locally.  Firefighters with decades of experience seem to forget some of the basics.  Perhaps they take a shortcut, emboldened by the lack of disaster as their shortcut worked so many times before.  These are trained professional firefighters, many of them friends I have known for years.  They know better.  Why, then do we do stupid things on the fireground?

Maybe it’s because we have gotten away with it before.

Maybe it’s because no one stopped us before.

Maybe it’s because “that’s the way we’ve always done it.”

But, maybe our luck will run out one day, as it does about every 80 hours here in America.

As a firefighter, do you feel you have the ability, indeed the responsibility to say “NO” to your company officer?  As a company officer, do you feel you have the ability, indeed the responsibility, to say “NO” to your chief officer?

In this video, who should have said, “NO”?  Everyone.  Even the camera operator, if he/she were a “trained firefighter” should have the ability, indeed the responsibility, to keep our brothers and sisters from killing themselves, purely because we don’t feel it is our place to say “NO.”

Departmental policies, procedures, and guidelines must allow for “All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.”

But moreover, each member must realize that they are not only able -but as trained firefighters- also responsible to stop unsafe practices.  We need to establish ownership of this responsibility.

If you or your department hasn’t made this paradigm shift, the time is yesterday.  Take your own steps now to enact each of the 16 Life Safety Initiatives.  Let each of us “trained professional firefighters” all work together to get the job done safely so we all go home at the end of the day.

Just say no.

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www.FirefighterNetCast.com

On Thursday, July 29th, Firefighter Netcast Presents The Voice of Reason will welcome special guest Shawn Longerich, Executive Director for the Cyanide Poisoning Treatment Coalition (CPTC) and can be found on the world wide web at www.FireSmoke.org.

The mission of the CPTC is to “focus the required attention and resources on the issues, the CPTC aims to increase awareness about the risk of fire smoke cyanide exposure as it relates to Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Detection, Diagnosis and Treatment”.

Please join Art and his guest, Shawn Longerich on Firefighter NetCast at 9:00 pm EDT on Thursday, July 29th for a very special evening as we explore the poisons in what we commonly call “smoke”.

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I stumbled across this video of a firefighter who found himself in a situation requiring an immediate egress from a second floor window.  Unfortunately, he needed a ladder and “a little help here!”.  Then, almost simultaneously, he appeared at a different window.  Wait- no that’s a SECOND firefighter “needing a little help here.”

Whenever you have interior crews operating, it is imperative to quickly throw ladders to every potential point of egress.  Firefighters operating on the outside have the responsibility to their brothers and sisters inside to provide them with a viable escape option should it be needed.  We don’t have time to play ‘catch-up.’

Ladders are not decorations on your engines and trucks.  Take a look at your ‘burning box.’  Where will your crews most likely need a ladder?  Put one there before you need it.

In the following video should a second ladder have been placed as well?  A third?

Also note what comes out of his lungs as he coughs at 3:50.  What does he need right now?  Does he have it?  Why not?

In this video, we can’t be sure how long the interior operations had been going on.  However, by the time the need for a ladder was finally realized, they had to run and get one, then figure out which of the windows to place their single ladder.

Once again, we have an excellent opportunity to learn and improve based on previous mistakes.  Rather than criticize their actions, revise your own.

Ladder early, ladder often.  Stay stoked!

-J

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First Interstste Bank Fire

On May 4 and May 5 of 1988, nearly 400 LAFD firefighters busted their butts getting a handle on what was the largest high-rise fire in their history at the First Interstate Bank at 707 West Wilshire. It took 64 fire companies, 10 City rescue ambulances, 17 private ambulances, 4 helicopters, 53 Command Officers and support personnel, and considerable assistance from other City departments to bring this fire under control in about four hours.The firefight that night would eventually provide for the foundation of training for high-rise operations around the world.

Comprehensive coverage of the incident can be found in an article by FireRescue Magazine in todays FirefighterNation.com. It includes a  timeline of events and videos taken that day. FireRescue Magazine’s Editor in Chief Timothy Sendelbach offers some thought-provoking lessons learned:

“At the time, the First Interstate Bank Fire was said to be, “the high-rise fire that you can’t put out.” More than 20 years later, the largest high-rise fire in LAFD history continues to provide valuable lessons to urban and suburban firefighters throughout the country. While many of the lessons from this incident have been applied–in engineering, building construction, fire prevention and fire suppression–many more have since resurfaced with deadly consequences (in short, we failed to learn from the past) pressure-reducing valves, overtaxed communications, air operations, out-of-service sprinkler systems, command and control issues, etc…In reading the post-incident report and the numerous links related to this incident, few will argue that this incident should be (if it isn’t already) one of the most formidable tools in training today’s firefighters in the challenges and complexities of high-rise operations.”

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